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I.

STATEME NT OF THE CASE

On October 26, 2016, Officer Scholten and Officer Walther with the City of Coeur d'
Alene Police Department, were observing traffic near the intersection of Third Street and Hattie
in Coeur d' Alene. They saw the driver of a passing truck talking aggressively and making arm
movements. (R.P., July 12, 2017 pp. 13-14) Officer Scholten began to follow the truck into the
parking lot of an apartment complex to initiate a traffic stop because the truck did not signal for a
turn. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 14) Officer Scholten activated his overhead emergency lights and
the driver of the truck, later identified as the defendant, Patrick Grom, pulled into a parking stall
and parked. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 14) Mr. Grom exited his vehicle and began to walk towards
the officer. (R.P., July 12, 2017 pp. 14-15)
Officer Scholten testified that Mr. Grom was argumentative and upset, but that he did
follow the officer's directions. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 15) Officer Scholten testified that he had
asked Mr. Grom to stop, identified himself as an officer, and explained to Mr. Grom the reason
why he was being stopped. He was told that it was a traffic stop, and he was not free to leave.
(R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 15) The officer testified that he was waiting for additional officers to
arrive at the scene to assist with a DUI investigation. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 15) The officer
patted Mr. Grom down for weapons. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 16) The officer testified that he
could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from Mr. Grom, his speech was slurred,
and he had glassy, bloodshot eyes. (R.P ., July 12, 2017 pp. 15-16) Additional officers arrived on
scene to assist Officer Scholten and Officer Walther. (R.P ., July 12, 2017 p.16)
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Throughout the contact, Mr. Grom asked if he could leave and asked for an attorney
p. 6, 8,
several times. Specifically, he asked for his attorney, Doug Phelps. (R.P., July 12, 2017
21, line 18)

Officer Scholten testified that while he was speaking with some officers, he

2017 p.
observed Mr. Grom running east on Hattie and away from the officers. (R.P., July 12,
12, 2017
17) Officer Scholten testified that he began running after Mr. Grom as well. (R.P., July
a short
p. 17-18) Officer Scholten and the other officers were able to apprehend Mr. Grom
arrest for
distance away. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 19) The officers then placed Mr. Grom under
Scholten
obstructing law enforcement under J.C. 18-705. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 19) Officer
out his
testified that Mr. Grom had requested to speak to his attorney several times through
form
contact with the officer. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 32 and 65, line 13-17) That the ALS
with an
throughout the State of Idaho is a common practice based on ALS to not allow contact
d
attorney. RP, July 12, 2016, pp. 38, 43. Sergeant Averitt testified that Mr. Grom had requeste
at the
to speak with his attorney within the time he had arrived on the scene and during his time
hospital. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 51, 58)
Mr. Grom was then taken to Kootenai Medical Center (KMC) to be medically cleared.
collect
(R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 20) Sergeant Averitt testified that he attempted to administer and
that
breath samples from Mr. Grom. (R.P., July 12, 2017 pp. 53-55) Officer Scholten testified
p. 29)
Sergeant Averitt conducted an evidentiary blood test on Mr. Grom. (R.P ., July 12, 2017
Contrary to the State's assertion that Mr. Grom consented to a blood test, Mr. Grom
third
reserved his right to request his own independent evidentiary blood test from a neutral
d by
party, which Sergeant Averitt misconstrued as consent to the evidentiary blood test requeste
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the police department. (R.P ., July 12, 2017 pp. 55-56) Mr. Grom requested an independent
evidentiary blood sample when he was at KMC. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 56) Officer Scholten
testified that while at the hospital, and after the evidentiary blood test was completed, Mr.
Grom' s requests to contact his attorney were denied until he was going to the jail. (R.P ., July 12,
2017 pp. 38-39)
After Mr. Grom was medically cleared from KMC, Officer Scholten transported him to
the Kootenai County Jail to be booked. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 26) Sergeant Averitt's testimony
indicated that Mr. Grom was arrested at 7:21 p.m. on October 26, 2016. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p.
63) Sergeant Averitt testified that breath tests were conducted on Mr. Grom at KMC at 11 :59
p.m. on October 26, 2016, and the blood draw for the evidentiary blood test was taken at 12: 18
a.m. the following day on October 27, 2016. (R.P., July 12, 2017 pp. 64-66) Sergeant Lafleur
testified that Mr. Grom was arrested at 9:52 p.m. on October 26, 2016 and that he arrived at the
jail at 12:41 a.m. on October 27, 2016. (R.P., July 12, 2017 pp. 108-109) Sergeant Lafleur
testified that Mr. Grom began the booking process at 1:35 a.m. on October 27, 2016. (R.P., July
12, 2017 p. 110) Sergeant Lafleur testified that Mr. Grom was not allowed to make his first
phone call from the jail until 9:37 a.m. on October 27, 2016. (R.P., July 12, 2017 p. 91)
Mr. Grom was unable to gather his own blood draw evidence to refute the State's
accusations , because he was not allowed access to an attorney during the critical timeframe
needed to mount a defense against DUI. The state charged Mr. Grom with DUI and Resisting
Arrest/Obstructing. Mr. Grom moved to suppress the evidence of the blood draw because the
state failed to obtain a search warrant, and was denied his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
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Amendm ent rights to an attorney pre and post-evid entiary testing. The Magistrate Court denied
the motion, finding that his Fifth and Sixth Amendm ent rights were not violated in his arrest or
incarceration, nor were they violated by denying him access to a phone to contact his attorney.
The Defendan t filed a notice of appeal after entry of a conditional plea on July 26, 2017. The
District Court heard briefing and oral argument on the appeal and entered its Memoran dum
Decision and Order on Appeal on May 9, 2018, holding that Idaho preceden t established the
constitutionality of LC. 18-8002 and as a result Mr. Grom's Fifth and Sixth Amendm ent rights
were not violated by the government. This appeal timely followed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
C. Did the trial court err when it denied Defenda nt's motion to suppress on the
basis that his constitutional rights were violated when law enforcement officers
prevented him from contacting his attorney for an unreasonable amount of
time?
D. Does Idaho Code §18-8002 violate Defenda nt's Fifth and Sixth Amendm ent
rights because it allows law enforcement to deny the Defendant his right to
counsel prior to evidentiary testing?

III.

ARGUM ENT ON APPEAL

A. The trial court erred when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress because
the Defenda nt's constitutional rights were violated when law enforcement
officers prevented him from contacting his attorney for an µnreasonable
amount of time.
The blood test results in this case should have been suppressed and the DUI case
dismissed because Mr. Grom was prejudice d in his inability to obtain exculpato ry evidence in his
DUI case because law enforcem ent did not allow him to contact an attorney until too much time
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had passed for him to obtain time sensitive evidence. A suspect must unambiguously request
counsel in order to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel- "he must articulate his desire
to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Davi!'. v. United S'!ates, 512 U.S.
452, 459, (1994). Where an individual asse1is a right to counsel, the interrogation must cease
until counsel has been made available to him, or until he himself "initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477,485 (1981).
The due process clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits deprivations of life, liberty or property without "fundamental fairness" through
governmental conduct that offends the community's sense of justice, decency and fair
play. Roberts v. State of Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st Cir. 1995). "The right of an accused in a
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).

The test for

determining whether state action violates procedural due process requires a court to consider
three distinct factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the existing procedures used and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976).
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In State v. Carr the Court found all of these factors were met when a DUI arrestee was
not allowed to call an attorney until 5 hour after her arrest for DUI. Stale v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,
911 P.2d 774 (1995). The Carr Court held that "when a person is arrested for DUI and given an
evidentiary BAC test, that person must be allowed, at a minimum, to make a phone call upon
request to do so." Id at 184. The Court reasoned that contact to a third party would be necessary
to facilitate evidence gathering to refute the State's evidence of intoxicatio n and thus preserves
the "right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations ." 14, Chambers, supra.
For example, the person contacted by the arrestee could facilitate the administrat ion of an
independen t alcohol concentrati on test, a right guaranteed by I.C. § 18-8002(4)( d), take pictures
of your eyes, and make third party independen t observation s about the arrestees "condition ."
The case at bar is similar to Carr. Mr. Grom made a clear and unambiguo us statement of
his desire to speak to his attorney, Douglas Phelps, and to obtain an independen t blood sample.
In fact, Mr. Grom made several statements expressing his desire to speak to his attorney,
Douglas Phelps, and to obtain an independen t blood sample (R.P. July 12, 2017 6,8,21 line 18).
Two blood samples taken at the direction of law enforcemen t does not substitute for the
defendant' s right to obtain an independen t blood sample, as alleged by the City. An independen t
blood sample is necessary to challenge the results of the State's DUI allegation. As recognized
by the Idaho Supreme Court, an "inherent exigency" exists in a DUI setting, due to the
destruction of the evidence by metabolism of alcohol in the blood. Stute v . Woolery, 116 Idaho
368,370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1989). Therefore, the only opportunity for a defendant in a DUI
case to gather exculpator y evidence is within a reasonable time following arrest and
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administration of the State's BAC test. See Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash.2d 733, 409 P.2d 867,
871 (1966).
Furthermore, Mr. Grom's blood sample was taken at 12:18 a.m., on October 27, 2016,
(R.P. July 12, 2017, 64-66) and he was unable to make a phone call until 9:37 a.m., on October
27, 2016. (R.P. July 12, 2017, 91) Mr. Grom had access to a phone nine hours after the blood
test was taken, but he did not have access to his cell phone which contained the cell phone
number of his attorney, Douglas Phelps. Mr. Grom repeatedly asked to call his attorney and law
enforcements denied his requests; for argument's sake, how would Mr. Grom know to ask the
officers at the booking desk to allow him to copy down his attorney's phone number from inside
his cell phone contacts list? In addition, even if Mr. Grom's attorney's phone number had been
listed in the phone book left inside the phone banks in the pre-booking area, he wouldn't be able
to reach him at any listed office number so early in the morning calling collect; the only chance
Mr. Grom would have at reaching his attorney at such an early time in the morning, would be on
his attorney's cell phone number, which Mr. Grom had been denied from obtaining due to law
enforcement's explanation that it was a safety hazard to do so. His attorney's cell phone number
would not have been listed in the phonebooks anyhow.
Sargeant Lafleur and Sargeant Averitt testified that they would not permit a defendant to
use his cell phone at any point during a DUI investigation, claiming a huge safety concern for
officers, and they do not know who the defendant would be calling and whether they could be
harmed. Sargeant Lefluer and Sargeant Averitt testified that once they were in the "controlled
environment" of the jail, then a defendant is permitted to obtain numbers from their cell phone
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with the assistance of the deputies. Mr. Grom was not pennitted to do this either. Further, there is
no record or evidence that Mr. Grom was allowed a phone call at 0100, as Sargeant LeFluer
indicated on his form.
Not only was Mr. Grom deprived an opportunity to timely contact a third party, he was
further deprived of being able to contact his attorney until he was bonded out of jail and had
access to his cell phone.
Mr. Grom was not given the opportunity to obtain the evidentiary test or other evidence
that he requested, as the State alleges. Mr. Grom was denied access to a telephone for nine hours
and complete denial of his cell phone to obtain his attorney's cell phone number. Mr. Grom was
unable to contact his attorney, he was unable to arrange for neutral third party testing of his
blood alcohol level and to have neutral third party witnesses observe his eyes, speech, take
pictures, and so forth. The State also alleges that there were plenty of "witnesses" at the hospital
to do this, but nursing staff working at the direction of law enforcement are not neutral third
party witnesses, according to I.C. 18-8002(4)(d), which clearly states that testing is made by
person of his own choosing.
The blood draw that was performed was not at Mr. Gram's request; the State is
misinterpreting Mr. Gram's request for an independent blood test as consent to the blood test
ordered by law enforcement because the results of the breathalyzer test were insufficient. The
statements made by the officers in their police reports are vague and ambiguous as to this issue.
The State further alleges that Mr. Grom did receive the test of his choosing by "independent
medical staff' and that he was also viewed by numerous third-party witnesses at the hospital.
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The Judge in this case even misconstrued the information when he stated that Mr. Grom, at his
consent and request, the officers' conduct and obtain an blood sample in a hospital environment,
concluding that it is not the agency that is obtaining the blood sample, but a third party medical
professional phlebotomist who is obtaining the blood sample in the context of the hospital.
(R.P., July 13, 2017 p. 153) This could not be further from the truth, because the evidentiary
blood test was drawn by the agency with a phlebotomist at the direction of the agencv. Mr.
Grom consented to the blood test ordered by law enforcement, but made statements to law
enforcement expressing his desire to obtain his own independent third-party testing.
An extra vial of blood taken by medical staff at the direction of law enforcement does not
substitute for Mr. Grom's right to obtain his own independent third-part testing within a
reasonable amount of time after his arrest. To be clear, Mr. Grom did not have the opportunity to
obtain his own independent third-party blood test, because he had been denied the opportunity to
contact his attorney within a reasonable amount of time. But Mr. Grom was also denied an
opportunity to have an independent video-taping or photographs made of his physical abilities.
The denial of access to counsel at the earliest opportunity denies the defendant any real
opportunity to prepare his defense.
Mr. Grom was denied the opportunity to make timely arrangements for his own
independent evidentiary testing. Had Mr. Grom been able to contact his attorney in a reasonable
time after his arrest and after the officers' evidentiary testing was completed, Mr. Grom, through
his attorney, would have been able to obtain his own independent evidentiary testing through a
neutral third party. He could have taken photos or video of the defendant for use at trial.
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Our previous case law establishes that a defendant must affirmatively assert his or her
State v.
right to an independent test in order to trigger a duty on the pm1 of the police. See
antrell, 139 Idaho at 411, 80 P.3d at 347. Once so triggered, this duty, at minimum, requires
timely
that police not deny or materially interfere with a detainee's opportunity to make
see
arrangements for such testing. Id.; State v. Rountree, 129 Idaho at 150, 922 P.2d at 1076;
also State v. Madden, 127 Idaho at 896, 908 P.2d at 589.
.
Here the officers repeatedly denied the defendant an opp011unity to contact his attorney
defense
The availability of cell phones creates greater opportunity for defendants to begin their
immediately by contacting counsel.

The lengthy denial of access to counsel given the

on
availability of cell phones cannot be permitted. The cell phone places a much smaller burden
law enforcement in allowing greater access to counsel on a more reasonable timeframe.
B.

Idaho Code §18-8002 is unconstitutional and violates Defend ant's Fifth and
Sixth Amend ment rights because it allows law enforcement to deny the
Defendant his right to counsel prior to evidentiary testing.

§
The rationale for denying a driver suspected of DUI the right to counsel pursuant to I.C.

and the
18-8002(2) is based upon the state's interest in obtaining swift blood-alcohol test results
appellate
need for swiftness is based on exigency. As noted by the District Court acting in its
804 P .2d
capacity, the precedent for this rationale is Matter of McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 189,
d911,918 (Ct. App. 1990)("The state's interest in providing an expedient blood testing metho
by
and thereby increasing its accuracy in detecting drunk drivers -is rationally served
to first
eliminating one of the impediments to BAC testing -the time needed by a licensee
.
contact, then consult, with his or her attorney before deciding whether or not to be tested.")
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However, this viewpoint of using exigency to deprive an individual of their constitutional
rights is abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Missouri v . M cNeely and the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding in State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773,339 P.3d 1177 (2014). In Missouri
v. McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court warned against creating categorical rules to be used when
depriving an individual of a constitutional right in favor of a statutory exception which deprives
an individual of a different constitutional right.
There, McNeely had been stopped and arrested for DUI. Mi ssouri v. McNeely, 133 S.
Ct. 1552, 1554, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). Prior to his arrest, Missouri's implied consent statute
had been amended to remove a motorists' statutorily granted right to refuse a blood test, instead
authorizing law enforcement to obtain a warrantless blood draw after a motorist's refusal to
submit to a test. 1 Idaho's implied consent statute likewise purports to authorize law enforcement
to extract blood after, or in spite of, a motorist's refusal to submit to test. See, I.C. 18 § 80028004; see also, State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). After his arrest,
McNeely was asked to provide a breath sample.

McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1554.

McNeely

refused. Id. Due to the officer's training concerning the nature of Missouri's implied consent
law, he thereafter transported McNeely the hospital for a warrantless blood draw. Id.
In a footnote the Missouri Supreme Court explained the history of Missouri's implied consent law:
... the fonner version of section 577 .041.1 stated that if a person refused both the breath-analyzer and the
blood draw test, then ·' none shall be given ." Section 577.041.1, RSMo Supp.2008. However, that section was
amended prior to Defendant's a1Test by the deletion of the phrase " and none shall be given:· Section
577.041.1, RSMo. Supp.2010. With the removal of that phrase, the prosecutor asserted that police officers
now may "rely on the well settled principle that obtaining blood from an arrestee on probable cause without a
wan·ant and without actual consent does not offend constitutional guarantees:· The prosecutor's assertion rests
on a fundamental misreading of Schmerber."
Stmc v, McNeely, 358 S. W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2012), reh'g denied (Mar. 6, 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 98, 183 L. Ed . 2d 737
(U.S. 2012) and afj'd, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (U.S. 2013).
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McNeely argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the state from subjecting him to
a warrantless, nonconsensua l blood draw. The State of Missouri and its Amici argued to the
contrary, asking the Court to put their stamp of approval upon a decades old interpretation of the
its prior decision in Schmerber v. California, i.e. that the evanescent nature of alcohol, in and of
itself, constituted exigent circumstances and therefore a per se exception to the warrant
requirement:
[t]he State contends that whenever an officer has probable cause to believe an
individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, exigent
circumstances will necessarily exist because BAC evidence is inherently
evanescent. As a result, the State claims that so long as the officer has
probable cause and the blood test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is
categorically reasonable for law enforcement to obtain the blood sample
without a warrant.

Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1560, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). So the argument went,
with exigency inherent in each and every DUI case, a driver who declines to submit to testing
would be subject to a nonconsensua l blood test without any precondition for a warrant. Such an
argument was rejected by the Court:
[h Jere and in its own courts the State based its case on an insistence that a
driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving under
the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensua l blood test
without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect.
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). The Court held that
exigent circumstances do not exist in each and every DUI case, but rather they must be proven
by the state and determined on a case by case basis:
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.. .it does not follow that we should depart from careful case-by-case
assessment of exigency and adopt the categorical rule proposed by the State
and its amici . ... We do not doubt that some circumstances will make obtaining
a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream
will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood
test. That, however, is a reason to decide each case on its facts, as we did in
Schmerber, not to accept the "considerable overgeneraliz ation" that a per se
rule would reflect.
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) (internal citations
omitted). Ultimately, the Court ruled that:
[i]n those drunk driving investigations where police officers can reasonably
obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that
they do so.
Id. With this ruling, absent a showing of actual exigent circumstances, motorists now possess a
recognized 4th Amendment protection against warrantless blood draws.
Moving to the question of exigency, the McNeely Court referred to the "special facts"
confronting the officer in Schmerber v. California where the Court had previously found exigent
circumstances to exist. Mis::muri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1560, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013)
(citing Schmcrber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1836, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908
(1966)). In Schmerber, we had a single officer, in the 1960s, investigating an accident while also
charged with transporting an injured suspect to the hospital. Missouri v. Mt;Neely, 133 S. Ct.
1552, 1557, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). Further, the Court noted that at the time, there did not
exist the technological advances now present, nor even the procedure in place, to procure
warrants telephonically. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1562, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013).
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Given those "special facts" and under the circumstances as they existed in that day and age,
"there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." Sch merbcr, 384 at 771.
A search conducted by law enforcement officers without a warrant is per se unreasonable
unless the State proves it fell within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973); State v. Dom.inguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d 325, 327 (Ct.App.2002 ). A search
conducted with consent that was voluntarily given is one such exception. Sclmeck loth. 412 U .S.
at 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. The State has the burden of
proving, by a preponderanc e of the evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than the result
of duress or coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221, 93 S.Ct. 2041; State v.
Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 554,
989 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct.App.1999 ); Dominguez. 137 Idaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. A voluntary
decision is one that is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041. See also,

ulombe v.

onnect icut. 367 U.S. 568,

602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961).
More recently, Idaho Supreme Court held that "because McNeely prohibits per se
exceptions to the warrant requirement ... Idaho's implied consent statute does not fall under the
consent exception to the Fourth Amendment." State v. Wulf( 157 Idaho 416,337 P.3d 575
(2014). Moreover, the court expressly overruled Diaz and Wooley to the extent that they applied
Idaho's implied consent statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutional ly allowed forced,
warrantless, blood draws. Id.
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J.C. § 18-8002(2) takes a "stick and carrot" approach when it comes to an individual' s
constitutional rights.

The statute essentially says that if an individual will submit to the

evidentiary testing, thereby waiving their Fourth Amendmen t right, then the individual will be
given an opportunity to consult with an attorney. That is the carrot. However, if an individual
refuses to submit to the evidentiary test, the statute deprives that individual of their Fifth and
Sixth Amendmen t rights to consult with an attorney prior to the testing. That is the stick.
Here, the governmen t's interest in depriving Mr. Grom of his Fifth and Sixth Amendmen t
rights to counsel were based upon their concern that Mr. Grom could contact bad actors who
might then "fight and harm one of [the] officers." R.P., p. 59. But this rationale also quickly
evaporates in light of technologic al advances where law enforceme nt can quickly verify the
phone number the defendant intends to call, thereby determinin g before the phone call who the
defendant is actually contacting. As the District Court found, this would place "minimal
disruption on the investigatio n." Decision at 10.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits the governmen t from conditionin g the
grant of a privilege upon the waiver of a constitutional right. The U.S. Supreme Court set forth
the unconstitut ional conditions doctrine in Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of Stale o f al.:
[i]t would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation
which, by words of express divestment , seeks to strip the citizen of rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitutio n, but to uphold an act by which the same
result is accomplish ed under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for
a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not
necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it
sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited,
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require

15

the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like
manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated
out of existence.
Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593-94, 46 S. Ct. 605, 607, 70 L. Ed. 1101
( 1926) ( emphasis ours). The doctrine has been applied in a number of jurisdictions, including
Arizona and Georgia, to the granting of the privilege to drive. Those courts dealing with the
issue have all held that the doctrine prevents the conditioning of the privilege to drive upon the
waiver of one's Fourth amendment rights. As it is now clear, following McNeely, that motorists
have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless blood draws, absent a true showing
of exigent circumstances, the state is not free to condition the granting of the privilege to drive
upon a citizen's waiver of that right. In other words, consent may not be "implied" with respect
to warrantless blood draws.
Idaho's implied consent law purports to condition the privilege to contact an attorney
upon one giving their consent to a warrantless blood draw upon law enforcement's suspicion of
DUI. Idaho's Implied consent Statute, LC. § 18-8002 provides in part:

(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.
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I.C. § 18-8002(1 ). Defendant recognizes that several Idaho courts, prior to McNeely, have held
that a driver was deemed to have given his "implied" consent to a warrantless blood draw merely
by driving upon the roadways of the state:
[u]nder Idaho's implied consent statute, LC.§ 18-8002(1), anyone d1iving on
Idaho roads is deemed to have impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for
the presence of alcohol or drugs when a police officer has reasonable cause to
believe the person was driving under the influence. In other words, "[b ]y
virtue of this statute, 'anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor
vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in advance to submit to a BAC
test.' " Rodriguez, 128 Idaho at 523, 915 P.2d at 1381 (quoting Matter of
McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 187, 804 P.2d 911, 916 (Ct.App.1990)). See also
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739. Implied consent to evidentiary testing is
not limited to a breathalyzer test, but may also include testing the suspect's
blood or urine. LC. § 18-8002(9)
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712-13, 184 P.3d 215, 218-19 (Ct. App. 2008).

However,

Defendant would argue that such a conditional grant of the privilege to drive was not considered
to afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine due to the fact that under pre-McNeely
jurisprudence it was believed that an individual held no constitutional right to be free from
warrantless blood draws. See,

late v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 306, 328 P.2d 1065, 1071 (1958);

see also, State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 489, 680 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 1984). As the
McNeely decision has changed the constitutional landscape in this regard, and it is settled that
motorists do in fact have a protected Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless blood
draws, the State is prohibited from conditioning the granting of the privilege to drive upon a
waiver of that right.
Due to the recency of the McNeely decision, no court holding precedential authority has
ruled on the constitutionality of states implied consent statutes with respect to compelled blood
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draws. However, as stated infra, a number of courts have dealt with the issue of statutorily
implying consent to warrantless blood draws where the Fourth Amendmen t would otherwise
prohibit such a search, e.g. where probable cause was lacking to suspect the motorist of DUI. In
each such case those Courts held that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibited the
legislature from conditioning the grant of the privilege to drive upon the waiver of the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.

In other words, those courts held that the legislature

could not circumvent the Fourth Amendmen t by "implying" consent to an otherwise unlawful
search. State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 72-73, 178 P .3d 1190, 1196-97 (Ct. App. 2008), Cooper v.
State, 277 Ga. 282, 289-91, 587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003), Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977,
986-87 on reh'g~ 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
In State v. Quinn, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled on the constitutionality of a section
of the Arizona implied consent law which purported to "imply" a motorists' consent to
warrantless blood draws absent probable cause to believe the motorist to have been DUI.
Specifically, the statute at issue sought to imply consent in every instance where a motorist was
involved in an accident which resulted in death or serious injury to another. State v. Quinn, 218
Ariz. 66, 69, 178 P.3d 1190, 1193 (Ct. App. 2008). The defendant, Quinn, was involved in such
an accident. It was undisputed that law enforcemen t did not possess probable cause to believe
Quinn to be DUI. Nevertheless, acting under authority of Arizona's implied consent statute, law
enforcement extracted blood without a warrant and absent actual consent. The State of Arizona
argued that consent was implied by the operation of statute:
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[t]he State further asserts that, even assuming the statute does not fit within the
special needs exception, Quinn consented to the search because § 28-673
specifies that all those who drive a vehicle on Arizona roads consent to such a
search. In support it relies on Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel. Ariz. Highway
Dep't, 203 Ariz. 326, 334, ,r 19, 54 P.3d 355, 363 (App.2002), which held,
"driving in Arizona is not a right, but a privilege, subject to legislative
mandate."
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 72, 178 P.3d 1190, 1196 (Ct. App. 2008). In rejecting the state's
argument, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for DUI prior to
the extraction of blood:
[n]ormally, because any forced extraction of blood by the State invades one's
expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, the intrusion is subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 9, ,r 27,
49 P.3d 273, 281 (2002); see also Schmerber v. alifornia, 384 U.S. 757, 767,
86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). As Schmerber explains, the State's
unconsented-to search of a person's blood requires probable cause to believe
that the search will reveal the presence of controlled or intoxicating
substances. 384 U.S. at 768-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Schmerber Court stated
that:
[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any [] intrusions [into a person's blood] on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence
may disappear. ...
Id. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826.
Stat v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 68-69, 178 P.3d 1190, 1192-93 (Ct. App. 2008). Applying the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the statute, the Court ruled the statute an unconstitutional
exercise of legislative authority:
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... states may not condition the grant of a privilege on the forfeiture of a
constitutional right..."a statute cannot circumvent a finnly established
constitutional right."
As Schmerber makes clear, Quinn's constitutional right is to be free of any
searches of her blood "[i] n the absence of a clear indication" that her blood
would demonstrate the presence of alcohol or other controlled substances.
Thus, within the limits of the Constitution, the State cannot condition Quinn's
driving privilege on the surrender of her constitutional right not to have
evidence admitted against her in a criminal prosecution that was taken from
her without a consent and in the absence of probable cause.
State v. Qui1rn, 218 Ariz. 66, 73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1197 (Ct. App. 2008).

with a statute nearly identical to that in Quinn:
[u]nder OCGA § 40-5-55(a), because Cooper was involved in an accident
resulting in "serious injuries," as defined in subsection (c) of the statute, he
was deemed by operation of law to have given consent to the administered
blood test to determine if there was the presence of alcohol or any other drug.
Co per v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 285, 587 S.E.2d 605, 608 (2003) (citations omitted). The Georgia
Court noted:
[t]he high courts of several other states have grappled with the constitutionality
of provisions allowing the chemical testing of bodily substances without
probable cause or valid consent, and based solely on a serious traffic mishap.
These courts have uniformly rejected provisions which obviate the finding of
probable cause. See McDuff v. State, 763 So.2d 850 (Miss.2000); Blank v.
State, 3 P.3d 359 (Alaska 2000); King v. Ryan, 153 Ill.2d 449, 180 Ill.Dec.
260, 607 N.E.2d 154 (1992); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d
308 (Pa.1992). Compare State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472 (Maine 1996).
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 287-88, 587 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (2003). The Court then held, as

did the Court in Quinn that an implied consent statute could not act to imply consent where to do

20

so would requlfe the waiver of a motorist's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure:

[t]his Court's use of the term "suspect" in regard to the Implied Consent
Statute brings into sharp focus the flaw in that portion of the statute compelling
chemical testing of the person merely by virtue of involvement in a traffic
accident resulting in serious injury or fatality. There is no requirement of
individualized suspicion, much less probable cause, that would render the
person "suspect" of impaired driving.
Thus, to the extent that OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires chemical testing of the
operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious
injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause, it
authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and
Federal Constitutions.
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,290, 587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003). In so holding, the Court cited

the following language from the Indiana Court of Appeals in Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977,
987 (Ind.App.2003):
[t]he legislature cannot, however, abrogate a person's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined by the
Supreme Court. To hold that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws
stating that a person "impliedly" consents to searches under certain
circumstances where a search would otherwise be unlawful would be to
condone an unconstitutional bypassing of the Fourth Amendment.
Co per

. State, 277 Ga. 282, 290, 587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003). The Cou11 concluded by

stating:
"The requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating." Hannay v.
State, supra at 988. The illegally-obtained test results were not admissible
against Cooper at trial, and the trial court erred in denying Cooper's motion to
suppress such evidence.
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Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 291, 587 S.E.2d 605, 613 (2003).
In Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, on reh'g~ 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), the
Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the constitutional ity of the Marion County Sheriff
Department's policy of obtaining blood samples without probable cause from drivers involved in
'

accidents resulting in serious bodily injury or death. Id. Hannoy was involved in an accident
involving the death of another individual and, as in Quinn and Cooper, law enforcement lacked
probable cause to believe Hannoy to be DUI. Rejecting a "special needs" argument as well as an
argument that Indiana's implied consent statute authorized the blood draw, the Court found the
warrantless blood draw unconstitutional:
[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating. We are well
aware of the pain and suffering inflicted by intoxicated drivers on our roads.
Nevertheless, we do not perceive that our opinion today, which will apparently
require alterations in the standard policy of at least one major Indiana law
enforcement agency, will unduly burden law enforcement officers in collecting
blood alcohol readings in cases such as this ... To the extent our holding today
may lead to the loss of blood alcohol or illicit drug content evidence in some
cases, we heed the words of the Supreme Court in Schmerber that the Fourth
Amendment imposes limitations on the ability of police to investigate criminal
activity and sometimes requires police to "suffer the risk" that certain evidence
thereby will not be obtained. 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835.
The withdrawal of Hannoy's blood was not obtained pursuant to the
guidelines in the implied consent statutes and cannot be justified as being
drawn in accordance with those statutes. The withdrawal was not
accomplished in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and Schmerber
because there was no probable cause to believe Hannoy was intoxicated at the
time his blood was drawn and no actual, knowing, and voluntary consent to
the withdrawal. The "special needs" exception to the probable cause
requirement cannot be applied in the context of a criminal investigation by
law enforcement. Therefore, the blood alcohol content evidence obtained
from the blood draw performed at the request of law enforcement was

22

illegally obtained and should not have been admitted into evidence by the trial
court.
Hannay, at 987-89 on reh'g~ 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
The McNeely Comi gave the clear mandate that "[i]n those drunk driving investigations
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn
without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates
that they do so." Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Thus,
after McNeely, a motorist arrested on suspicion of DUI now clearly has a constitutional right to
be free from warrantless intrusions into their body absent the existence of either a true showing
of exigent circumstances cause or actual valid consent. As such, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine now should prohibit the legislature from bypassing constitutional protections of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment and implying, or otherwise requiring, a waiver of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to consult with counsel upon the act of submitting to evidentiary testing in
violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Patrick Grom is requesting remand for a new trial and suppression of a blood test
based upon two legal arguments. First, the officer unreasonably denied him access to counsel for
more than nine hours after a blood test was drawn and more than fourteen hours after his arrest.
Additionally, Mr. Patrick Grom was denied access to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments based upon Idaho Code 18-8002 which requires an evidentiary test before access to
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an attorney will be allowed.

That requirement creates an unconstitutional condition which

violates the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Respectfully submitted this ~

day of June, 2019

Douglas D. Phelps, ISB # 4755
Phelps & Associates, PS
Attorney for Respondent
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